For peace to be possible, Israel must abandon its bull-headed ambitions that run counter to international law, while the Arabs must define and defend their higher collective interests, writes Hassan Nafaa*
There was a definite upbeat air to statements issued from the recent Riyadh Arab summit. Interestingly, the mood applied not only to the Arab League secretary-general and heads of the so-called moderate Arab states, but also to leaders of those countries that have been branded ‘extremist‘. Now, while I fully appreciate the enormous efforts expended by Saudi Arabia and other governments to quell some of the fires blazing throughout the Arab world in order to generate an appropriate climate for the summit to convene without risk of collapse, the Arab world needs something far greater and more important than smooth and artificially congenial summits that everyone in the Arab world knows will produce nothing more than announcements and resolutions worded malleably enough to suit the whims of every participant. What the Arab world needs is a thorough reassessment of the policies that brought it to its current state of fragmentation and discord. Then, from the lessons learned through this analysis, we should be able to formulate alternative policies that can be translated into programmes capable of effectively mobilising our collective resources in a way that strikes a harmonious balance between the needs of individual Arab states and the higher collective interests of all.
To me, the key to attaining desired harmony resides in deriving a new and concise concept of what constitutes higher Arab interests. In formulating such a concept we must as far as possible avoid the airy and theoretical and focus on the concrete and workable. Only then will we be able to delineate the boundaries that let Arab states know where their duties and responsibilities to themselves end and their duties and responsibilities to the whole, as represented by the Arab League, begin. Only then will we be able to produce policies that are translatable into effective programmes on the complex terrain of the Arab world.
The Arab order has suffered more than enough from the chronic gap between slogans enshrined in Arab summit resolutions and the actual policies that are implemented with barely a nod to the slogans and that often work in the opposite direction of the intent of summit resolutions. If we do not reduce this gap to the furthest extent possible, inter-Arab cooperation will never take a positive step forward and will forever be going around in the same circle. There are two ways to minimise the gap: lowering the threshold of Arab cooperation to meet the current needs and circumstances of individual Arab nations or enhancing the capacity of Arab states to meet their obligations at a higher threshold.
Perhaps the time has come for Arab governments to be open and above board with their people. Either they should tell them that Arab cooperation is futile, regardless of the reasons that compel it, or actually commit to the obligations they have taken upon themselves. To pay lip service to cooperation and feign commitment, while surreptitiously going their own separate ways in conflict with obligations they agreed to, is no longer acceptable. Sadly, it is patently apparent that Arab governments are caught between a wall and a hard place. On the one hand, they do not want to admit that collective Arab action harms their interests because that would expose their weaknesses to their people. On the other hand, they are reluctant to abide by their commitments because that would make them vulnerable to international pressures they can do without. Sadly, they still think that the only way out of this predicament is to agree to collective resolutions they have no intention of acting upon and then cast blame for failure on others. There are dozens of examples, but perhaps the positions on the Arab peace initiative adopted in Beirut in 2002 and ‘revived‘ in the Riyadh summit of 2007 offer the clearest illustration of that vast gap between rhetoric and practice that has so severely plagued collective Arab action and which shows no sign of disappearing anytime soon.
The originally Saudi-sponsored Arab peace initiative was adopted in the first Arab summit held after 11 September 2001, which, in turn, occurred less than a year after the collapse of Camp David II, the most important bid ever undertaken by a US administration to broker a permanent solution to the Palestinian cause. Perhaps there was some justification, at least theoretically, for producing an initiative of that sort at that time. However, even then it was obvious that its success was contingent upon two chief factors: Israel and the US willingness to go along with it, and the resolve of Arab governments to stick to it as a final unalterable position that reflected minimum Arab demands and to demonstrate their resolve by various means. Yet, developments over the following five years amply demonstrated that the Arabs had not consulted with any international power, including the US and Europe, before producing that initiative and were not prepared to do what was needed to market it and rally their political weight behind it. Evidently, Sharon‘s flagrant snub of this initiative not only paralysed Arab capacity to react but also Arab ability to think of the next step. Then the gates of hell opened, with the Israeli reoccupation of the West Bank and siege on Yasser Arafat‘s compound in Ramallah followed by the American invasion of Iraq, all of which sent Arab regimes scurrying for ways to save their own hides from the consequences of a proposed ‘New Middle East‘. Only recently has there been some respite -- purely temporary in my opinion -- from the storm, which the Arabs saw as opportune for re-launching their initiative. So, we‘re faced with the same question: Is this really the right time to push the Arab initiative again?
The regional and international backdrop to the ‘revival‘ of the Arab peace initiative is considerably different to that of five years ago when the initiative was first aired. Today‘s backdrop is characterised primarily by the US quagmire in Iraq, the Israeli debacle in Lebanon, mounting tensions over Iran‘s nuclear programme and the spectre of war against that country. These factors have combined to compel the US and Israel to be a little less overbearing in their treatment of others -- the ‘moderate Arab states‘ in particular -- and a little more willing to ease the pressures on Arab governments, probably in order to mollify them in advance of a military confrontation with Iran. But this does not mean that the time is ripe to reintroduce the Arab initiative as a basis for setting into motion serious negotiations aimed at producing a comprehensive peaceful solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict, regardless of sudden US-Israeli interest in it. I have not the shadow of a doubt that it is not the dream of a comprehensive peace that motivates this interest but the desire to exploit the initiative tactically in order to enhance their ability to steer the Iranian crisis in their favour. At least two developments confirm this. The first was Washington‘s attempt, prior to the summit, to pressure Arab governments into dropping the Palestinian right of return from the initiative. The second, coming after this attempt failed, was Israel‘s suggestion that it might be willing to accept the initiative if, through bilateral or multilateral negotiations, it obtained an assurance from the Arabs and Saudi Arabia in particular of their good intentions. Clearly, this was no less than a flagrant bid to lure the Arabs into normalising relations with Israel, not only in advance of a settlement but also before Israel had even explicitly agreed to the initiative.
The Arab peace initiative contains three points that Israel has consistently and adamantly rejected in the past and shows no sign of accepting at present: first, to withdraw to pre-June 1967 borders; second, to resolve the Palestinian refugee problem in accordance with UN Resolution 194; third, for Israel to dismantle all settlements on all the occupied territories and relinquish all claims to sovereignty over any portion of these territories, including that which contains the Wailing Wall.
Israel has yet to realise that a final resolution to the Arab-Israel conflict must rest on a framework of internationally recognised political principles that, in turn, rules out claims that can only be justified on religious grounds. The framework is provided by UN General Assembly Resolution 181 of 1947 and UN Security Council Resolution 242 of 1967. The former, known as the partition resolution, enshrines the principle of equality in rights between the Palestinian and Jewish peoples and the principle of clear political boundaries between two equal, independent and fully sovereign states. A settlement concluded on these bases would resolve, once and for all, the major outstanding problems: final boundaries (detailed maps for this purpose are deposited with the General Assembly), Jerusalem (which the resolution states should remain united, but under the guardianship of the UN, rather than under Israeli sovereignty, which, in turn, means that Israel would have to renounce its claim to sovereignty not only over East Jerusalem but the whole of the Holy City), and the refugee issue (who would be able to return to their homes, because the partition maps were drawn before the refugee problem arose to begin with). As for Resolution 242, which also calls for a just solution to the refugee problem, it only becomes meaningful when associated with General Assembly Resolution 194 of 1949, which specifically addresses this problem. At the same time, since Resolution 242 stresses the internationally recognised prohibition against occupying the land of others by force, it can only be referring to transgression of the boundaries of 1967 as opposed to those of 1947.
Under this framework of international law, Israel has two choices. If it accepts the 1947 partition boundaries, Palestinians would return to their original homes in what was originally designated as the state of Palestine. If it accepts the 1967 boundaries, Israel would be obliged to return all of East Jerusalem, inclusive of the Wailing Wall, to Palestinian sovereignty (with guaranteed recognition of the right of Jews to visit the Wailing Wall) and it would also have to accept the return of those Palestinians who so wish to their homes in Israel proper and their nationalisation as Israeli citizens.
The fact is that any other solution keeps the door open to the debate over what are referred to as ‘historical rights‘ and, hence, another century of endless conflict. Otherwise put, a just and viable political solution means that Israel must either accept the 1948 boundaries or the 1967 boundaries plus the right of return. There is no third choice. Will Israel ever come to understand this, or is the Arab-Israeli conflict doomed to remain a religious struggle that eludes peaceful resolution?
* The writer is a professor of political science at Cairo University.